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CRIMINAL LAW

I.

INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

In Faunteroy v. United States,' the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a jury instruction containing an improper definition of the
standard of negligence, necessary to sustain an involuntary manslaughter
conviction, was not prejudicial error where the record2 reflected that the
defendants were, in fact, guilty of culpable negligence.
After it was established that their child's death was caused by pneumonia and malnutrition, the defendants were convicted of involuntary manslaughter. The jury was instructed that the proper standard of negligence
required to sustain a conviction of negligence was "culpable negligence."
However, the judge instructed in terms amounting only to simple or civil
negligence. Although the judge's instruction was incorrect, the record
showed that the defendants were guilty of reckless omission in not sufficiently caring for their child.3 Since the test for culpable negligence, of
which the defendants were guilty, is more strict than for simple negligence,4 the court held that the improper jury instructions were not prejudicial error. By specifying malnutrition and pneumonia as examples of
unreasonable care by the parents, the court clarified the type of conduct
that would sustain a conviction of involuntary manslaughter under the
Bradford test. 5
II.

CRIMINAL COMMITMENT

In Jones v. United States,6 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
held that an individual committed to a mental institution for a crime must
be released after being held for a time equal to the maximum possible term
for which he could have been incarcerated. The defendant had been
found not guilty of petit larceny by reason of insanity. Thereafter, pursuant to section 24-301(d) of the D.C. Code, 8 a "release hearing" was held
1. 413 A.2d 1294 (D.C. 1980).

2. Id at 1299.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id See United States v. Bradford, 344 A.2d 208 (D.C. 1975).
413 A.2d at 1299.
Id See 344 A.2d at 215-16.
411 A.2d 624 (D.C. 1980).
Id at 630. See United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
D.C. CODE § 24-301(d) (1973).
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and Jones was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital indefinitely. The
court followed United States v. Brown 9 and agreed that there was no basis
for confining an acquitee under section 24-301(d) beyond the length of the
hypothetical prison term, since that term marked the end of society's claim
to punishment of that individual. A longer confinement term would have
to be preceded by a de novo civil commitment procedure.'°
III.

SENTENCING

In Christopher v. United States," the District of Columbia Court of Appeals declared that the substitution of a greater sentence for an illegal
lesser sentence is not prohibited by the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution. Petitioner appealed the trial court's imposition of a
greater sentence by sua sponte correction of an illegal earlier sentence that
petitioner had already begun to serve.
The court stated that the constitution allows a court to mitigate a sentence but not increase punishment. 2 However, an established exception to
the rule has arisen where the original sentence was illegal, because an illegal sentence is a nullity. 3 Hence, a longer term of imprisonment upon
resentencing is
not a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the federal
4
constitution. 1
In Jones v. United States,'5 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
upheld the use of a defendant's one prior felony conviction for the purpose
of enhancing both his sentence for robbery and his sentence for carrying a
pistol without a license. The defendant's conviction for armed robbery
was disclosed to the court before his arraignment on charges of armed robbery and carrying a pistol without a license. The defendant entered pleas
of guilty to both charges. Henson v. United States,' 6 a District of Columbia
case decided the day after Jones entered his guilty pleas, held that in the
9. 478 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
10. 411 A.2d at 630. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1972); Baxstrom v.
Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 110-11 (1966); United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d at 611-12.
11. 415 A.2d 803 (D.C. 1980).

12. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931); accord,Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 163, 175 (1873).
13. See, e.g., Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1947); Burns v. United
States, 552 F.2d 828, 831 (8th Cir. 1977); James v. United States, 348 F.2d 430, 432-33 (10th
Cir. 1965).
14. See Bums v. United States, 552 F.2d at 831; James v. United States, 348 F.2d at
432-33; Hayes v. United States, 249 F.2d 516, 517-18 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
15. 416 A.2d 1236 (D.C. 1980).

16. 399 A.2d 16 (D.C.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 848 (1979).
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same proceeding a single prior felony conviction could not be used both to
transform a violation into a felony offense and serve as one of the two
prior felonies required to impose a greater sentence. In the present case,
Jones' prior felony conviction was used first to expose him to the express
provisions for recidivism in the District of Columbia Code,' 7 which provide that if the violation of the Code occurs after conviction of a felony,
"he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years. '"18
The second use of the prior felony conviction-to enhance the maximum
sentence for the robbery-was permitted by the provisions of section 22104 of the District of Columbia Code 9 and by case law interpreting congressional intent concerning recidivism. 20 As distinguished from Henson,
Jones' prior felony conviction was not used both to convert his pistol-carrying offense into a felony and serve as one of the two prior felony convictions necessary for enhanced sentencing. The court found that such
"bootstrapping," prohibited by Henson, was not present in Jones.
In Daniel v. United States,2 ' the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
employed a "rational basis" test and upheld the constitutionality of section
23-1328 of the District of Columbia Code, 22 which imposes a harsher sentence on defendants who commit crimes while released on bail pending
trial. The defendant was charged with three misdemeanors and released
on bond pursuant to section 23-1328 of the District of Columbia Code.23
While out on bond, he was arrested on felony charges and notified that he
would be subject to additional penalties under the release offender statute.24
Historically, courts have employed the less rigorous rational basis test to
examine such statutory sentencing classifications as section 23-1328.25 As
the legislative history of the section reveals, Congress was concerned about
the large number of crimes committed by people on pretrial release. The
17. D.C. CODE § 22-3204 (1973).

18. Id
19. D.C. CODE § 22-104 (1973).
20. 416 A.2d at 1238; Smith v. United States, 304 A.2d 28 (D.C.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1114 (1973).
21. 408 A.2d 1231 (D.C. 1980).
22. D.C. CODE § 23-1328 (1973).
23. Id
24.

D.C. CODE § 23-1321 (1973).

25. See Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S.
263 (1973); United States v. Thomas, 485 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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Daniel court therefore held that Congress's attempt to deter "bail recidivism" was a permissible governmental objective on which to base the
criminal sanctions of section 23-1328.26
William Ward

26. 408 A.2d at 1233.

